Thursday, January 26, 2012

Dignity--Australopithecines, Humans, and God

In his book Human Dignity, George Kateb writes, “The core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is the greatest type of beings—or what we call species because we have learned to see humanity as one species in the animal kingdom, which is made up of many other species along with our own—and that every member deserves to be treated in a manner consonant with the high worth of the species."

An interesting thought experiment.  Suppose first of all that there were not such a gulf between us and the other animals.  Suppose, in other words, that there still lived a continuum of hominids between us and, say, the australopithecines.  What might that do to our conception of dignity?  Push this idea even further.  Suppose there existed (either currently or in past times) a hominid species both cognitively and morally superior to us.  How might that affect our conception of dignity?

From a theological perspective, of course, our dignity comes from being in some way(s) like God.  But if you remove God from the picture and put in God’s place a superior, yet flawed species, would we still assert our dignity, based on our similarity to them?  Or is the whole comparison issue beside the point?  I would suspect that so long as the members of a species have a sense of self-worth (dare I bring in the notion of respect here?), they would have a conception of something like dignity.

4 comments:

  1. Is the thought experiment's suggestion that there are degrees of dignity, which accords with how far/little we've evolved?

    This seems like treacherous ground. We respect some animal species, e.g., those species that show some form of intelligence (cats or dogs), while we don't respect other animal species, e.g., those species that are more hedonistic (cows, pigs, chickens). The thought experiment seems to be evoking similar intuitions with respect to a hierarchy of human species. Some human species would be deserving of our respect and others would not. I guess we'd have to devise a system that would not permit some form of prejudice.

    I don't believe the comparison issue is besides the point, but it certainly seems to put our prejudices in full relief.

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  2. Hi Stan,

    Thanks for your comments. When formulating the thought experiment, I didn't have the "degrees of dignity" idea in mind, but that's certainly something that might follow from it. And I certainly wouldn't be the first to make such an idea. Hobbes, for example, states that a person's dignity is precisely his price; that is, the degree of one's dignity depends on how much one is valued by society. (Of course, Kant more famously turned this formulation on its head more than a century later, when he stated that to have dignity is to be beyond price, and so it does not come in degrees.)

    In any case, in writing the thought experiment, I was wondering whether we would even still accord ourselves dignity if there existed a higher species of hominid or if there were lower species similar enough to us to also have some claim to it.

    Cheers!

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  3. It's funny that Hobbes would say that, especially considering his view of man in a state of nature. Isn't it that no one "deserves" our respect? Let's think of it this way: if I show respect to someone in a Hobbesian state of nature and that person recognizes my deference, then I expose a vulnerability not only to that person but others too. It seems that Hobbes' account of dignity suffers here (of course, I'm no Hobbes scholar; so, perhaps you can correct me on this).

    By "according ourselves dignity", do you mean everyone else and ourselves? It seems to me that there is a fine distinction to be drawn between dignity and self-respect. To my mind, self-respect is more difficult concept to understand, and I think it's self-respect your thought experiment is challenging. Here's the way I thought of the thought experiment. If we knew that a race of higher beings existed, then we would respect ourselves less than we do when we know we're the dominant species. Knowing our inferiority would affect the view we have of ourselves, but it would keep respect of others intact. That I respect myself and my species less doesn't necessarily affect the higher species. So, it's at least plausible that "according ourselves dignity" might be ambiguous between "dignity" (on the one hand) and "self-respect" (on the other). No?

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  4. Hi Stan,

    Thanks again for your comments!

    Note that I didn't say anything about Hobbesian dignity in the state of nature. For Hobbes, dignity is our price in society. I don't have "Leviathan" with me, but one of the examples he uses is about a general who is more valued by his society--and thus have more dignity--during a time of war than during a time of peace.

    I like that you brought up the notion of respect, for respect and dignity are closely intertwined, especially for Kant. Bringing in self-respect complicates things even more, in a good way.

    When I said "according ourselves dignity," I mean that in a very broad sense. So, what would we do as a species?

    My intuitions on self-respect and dignity are the polar opposite of yours. Supposing I knew of a higher race of beings, I could still very easily maintain my self-respect by living up to the ideals I hold for myself and exercising my highest capacities (whatever those are). I respect myself for a job well done, knowing there are plenty of people out there who could have done it better. However, my sense of dignity might take a hit knowing there's a higher species out there. According myself and others dignity in this case might then seem rather presumptuous. (Indeed, there are plenty of people out there who already consider it presumptuous, given our history of barbarism.) Note that I'm still only operating on the level of intuitions, as I still want to think more about what grounds our (sense of) dignity.

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