Sunday, January 29, 2012
Dignity and Utilitarianism
In Utilitarianism, Mill explains our privileging the higher pleasures by appeal to our sense of dignity: "but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them." (Notice that he does not say that the degree of dignity varies with our higher faculties; only our sense of dignity does.) And yet it can be charged that utilitarianism is fundamentally at odds with the notion of dignity, as suggested by many of the objections that have been raised against it. In asking whether it is permissible to enslave another, for example, the champion of dignity will argue that utilitarian considerations are entirely out of place. At bottom, what this comes to is whether any sort of value monism assumed by utilitarianism can accommodate a notion like dignity.
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Until you pointed it out, I had never paid much attention to the "dignity" portion of this very important component of Mill's theory. Since I haven't paid it much attention, I'm afraid my comment will likely miss its mark.
ReplyDeleteIs "privileging" an exercise of the higher or lower pleasures? It strikes me that privileging the higher pleasures could be the satisfaction of a base desire. Base desires are more common to the lower pleasures. So, if I'm understanding Mill correctly (and interpreting him charitably), our sense of dignity would be a part of the higher and lower pleasures.
The trouble is that every time I think about the lower pleasures, I cannot help but abandon any sense of dignity. To satisfy my lower pleasures I would have to be disrespectful of others.
I will have to think about the sense of dignity in Mill a bit more.
I don't know that privileging has to do with either the higher or lower pleasures. All it means it that we consider the higher pleasures more important (dare I say of higher value?) than the lower. One of the charges that has been leveled against Mill on this distinction is that it introduces a kind of value pluralism into his system and so complicates or perhaps even undermines the whole attempt to provide a moral decision-procedure.
ReplyDeleteMill also makes reference to dignity in "On Liberty," but in a very different context from "Utilitarianism." I've not studied it sufficiently to say anything useful about it yet ...
(Unfortunately, I don't have my Mill with me; so this next bit might be a trifle muddled. I'm hiking north across Canada and currently climbing ice cliffs outside the tiny town of Stony Rapids in Saskatchewan, Canada near Lake Athabasca. My hiking party and I will travel on foot starting tomorrow morning. We'll be setting out for Ennadai in Nunavat. Two in my party have died already from hypothermia. Wish us luck!)
ReplyDeleteLet me try to clarify the original point. On at least one account, "privileging" something over another is to want it more than the other. If that's correct, then "privileging" is a motivational state, much like desires are motivational states.
If higher pleasures bring us more pleasure, then is it possible that the pleasure associated with our wanting/privileging the higher pleasures is itself a lower pleasure (i.e., the feel-good quality)?
I believe Mill says that when we consider both the higher and lower pleasure, we will desire/want to pursue the higher pleasures. I'm sure Mill is more careful than this. Help me out by posting a little bit more of what Mill says when he's speaking of our preferences for higher pleasures. Thanks.
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ReplyDeleteI'm not comfortable with the idea that privileging something should be equated with desiring it. I might, for instance, privilege brussel sprouts over cupcakes vis a vis my health, but not have any desire to eat more brussel sprouts (particularly if I care nothing about my health). You're right that Mill thinks people who have experienced both the higher and lower pleasures will desire the higher pleasures more, but this desiring seems parasitic on our privileging the higher pleasures. And notice also that it has nothing to do with whether the higher pleasures bring us "more pleasure." It's not a quantitative issue. If it were, then he certainly wouldn't value the life of Socrates dissatisfied over the life of the satisfied fool. So, if it's not because they provide more pleasure, then why privilege the higher pleasures? Again, the conclusion he reaches is that it's based on our sense of dignity. Happy hiking!
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ReplyDeleteI have a worry and a concession. Let me tackle the latter first. Yes, I agree with you that privileging higher pleasure has nothing to do with bringing more pleasure. That would be a quantitative issue, and it's exactly the quantitative view Mill works to overcome in Utilitarianism. I can see now how what I wrote above could be interpreted to impose upon Mill a quantitative view. I should have been more careful when I wrote my comment.
ReplyDeleteNow for the worry. I still don't see how privileging something over another is not a matter of desiring it. I believe your example works against your view more so than it works for your view. Let me explain. Your privileging a brussels sprout over a cupcake is the result of conjoining your desire to be healthy and your belief that eating brussels sprouts is a healthy choice. I agree that you may not want to eat a brussels sprout. To be healthy, though, you have to eat brussels sprouts, so if you want to be healthy, you'll want to eat brussels sprouts.
Also, on your example, I don't see how you could want a cupcake more than brussels sprouts. Think of it this way. If you were to eat a cupcake in spite of your desire to be healthy, then we could say that you've acted against your better judgment, all things considered. This is a good example of an akratic action. To act akratically is to act irrationally. So, your privileging brussels sprouts over a cupcake is nothing but to satisfy your desire to be healthy and to act rationally.